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The Lexus, the Olive Tree, and the Controversial
Global "Democracy"
CHRISTINA A. URBANSKI*

INTRODUCTION

It is undisputed that the end of the Cold War brought with it a series of
changes that have been labeled "globalization." To survive in this new world
order, States are asked to redefine the purpose of their existence and to
interact with international organizations and other States in a manner that
would have been unthinkable in a world divided by the Iron Curtain. This
premise, of course, is passd to those who have previously explored the
character of this globalized world and have begun the process of identifying
and making sense of what is found. What remains new, however, is the way
this world is categorized, the boundaries that the globalized world provides and
encourages, and the rules that States must abide by to keep pace with this fastmoving, dynamic world.
Thomas Friedman, in his book The Lexus and the Olive Tree, has
defined the globalized world as one in which "free-market capitalism" reigns;
where the progressive pace of technology pushes States to adopt democratic
systems that promote the opening of financial markets on a massive scale.'
Friedman asserts that only one kind of State will successfully emerge from
within a globalized world: a State whose political and economic structure is
uniquely adapted to the globalized economic system-one that is, in fact,
modeled entirely on the system of government and the economic regime of the
United States.2
However, while Thomas Friedman's conceptualization of the globalized
world and the innovations that have fostered it are comprehensive, in the sense
that they thoroughly discuss the political and economic forces underlying this
* J.D. Candidate, 2000, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.S., BusinessManagement, 1997, Indiana University-Bloomington. I would like to thank Dean Alfred C. Aman,
Jr. for his invaluable comments and support throughout the development of this paper. I would also
like to thank my family for their continuous love and encouragement.
1. THoMAs L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (1999).
2. Id. at 298-303 (describing the perfect global competitor).
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phenomenon, he fails to seriously discuss the obstacles developing States will
face in trying to tie into this global economy. Furthermore, his pronouncement
that a free-market capitalist economy will be the most successful form of
economic system in the global era is unremarkable. But for his assertion that
the driving force behind globalization includes, primarily, private investment in
international corporations and State bond markets, his analysis merely
reiterates that of Francis Fukuyama and gives fatuous titles to theories that
have already been declared in other literature discussing the era of
globalization.3
As Friedman is not the first person to speculate about what kind of
political, economic, legal, social, and financial systems a State will need to
adopt for it to become competitive in the era of globalization, his theories will
be compared with those articulated by authors who do not equate capitalism
with democracy, but rather promote creative, evolving democratic systems of
government as preferable to singular systems cloned from the existing
capitalist democracy in the United States.4 This Essay will compare and
contrast these options, paying particular attention to the idea that the
"democratic" system proposed by Friedman is only "democratic" in the sense
that it is based on thecapitalisteconomic system that has flourished alongside
the democratic government of the United States.
Part I of this Essay will discuss and delineate the most salient aspects of
The Lexus andthe Olive Tree, which, primarily, adds a new vocabulary to the
discussion ofglobalization and provides a unique perspective on the forces that
are coming together to shape the global era. This Part will also consider the
elements comprising Friedman's conception of a capitalist democracy and
discuss the various mechanisms States will need to put in place to become,
what Friedman considers, successful competitors in the era of globalization.
Part II of this Essay will illustrate that a State does not necessarily have to
adopt both capitalist and democratic ideals to survive in a globalized world,
even if the combination of these systems is considered optimal. One section
of Part II is devoted to the discussion of democracy within individual States;

3. See FRANcIs FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992). These other
theories will be noted and discussed at various points throughout this Essay.
4. As Thomas Frank notes, "[m]uch of Friedman's millennial enthusiasm arises from the
mundane faith that capitalism is functionally identical to democracy. . . . His definition of
democracy is a simple matter of 'one dollar, one vote,' a system in which the market and corporate
interests rightly and naturally get to dictate to everyone else." Thomas Frank, It's Globalicious!
Two servings, half-baked,of the new economy, HARPER'S, Oct. 1999, at 72, 72-73.
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the other section focuses on transnational democracy and its effects on the
sovereignty of individual States.
This Essay is entitled the controversial global "democracy" because I
believe that the future of globalization mandates the adoption of not one
particular version of capitalist democracy, but a variety of governmental
systems whose fundamental commonality lies in their use of free and open
elections, or government officials elected by "the people." Beyond this
requirement, "democratic" States will actually employ an evolutionary form of
democracy (from that implemented in the United States) that conforms to their
own social heritage and political preferences. "Democracy" in the era of
globalization will therefore include all governmental systems that incorporate
both a free and open electoral system and a capitalist economic system tied
into the global economy; but beyond these fundamental requirements will
reside a multitude of diverse political systems and social structures.
Under this conception of democracy, all States will continuously improve
and refine their political, economic, legal, social, and financial systems. The
need to continuously improve these underlying systems is not limited to the
periphery or developing States, but expands to the current world leaders of the
global market, including the United States. In this respect, my model of
democracy challenges all States to learn from and adjust to each other in the
spirit of developing a sustainable global market. This vision of democracy in
the global era is in stark contrast to the conception of globalization proposed
in The Lexus and the Olive Tree, in which Friedman fashions a globalized
world connected by a free-market economic system and based on the adoption
of a distinctly American form of democracy by all connected States. To
ascertain the distinction between these two views, the next section discusses
Friedman's vision of democracy in the era of globalization.
I. FRIEDMAN'S GLOBALIZATION

Thomas Friedman's primary focus in The Lexus and the Olive Tree is
on the economic and political forces that drive States toward participation in
a globalized economy, with a central topic being "how the age-old quests for
material betterment and for individual and communal identity" are attained in
the era of globalization.' His view of globalization can be identified as
"hyperglobalist" in that he believes "globalization defines a new era in which
5. FRIEDMAN, supra note I, at 29.
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peoples everywhere are increasingly subject to the disciplines of the global
marketplace. ' 6 He asserts that everyone-either directly or indirectly-is
feeling the effects of globalization. 7 Thus, the main challenge for States and
individuals in the global era is "to find a healthy balance between preserving
a sense of identity, home and community and doing what it takes to survive
within the globalization system."' This endeavor is embodied by the symbols
of the Lexus and the olive tree. The olive tree represents "everything that
roots us, anchors us, identifies us and locates us in this world-whether it be
belonging to a family, a community, a tribe, a nation, a religion, or, most of all,
a place called home."9 The Lexus (as in the automobile) characterizes the
"drive for sustenance, improvement, prosperity and modernization."'' 0 These
two forces must be reconciled for a State to successfully integrate into the
global economy and, at the same time, preserve a sense of uniqueness in a
world that pressures States and individuals to become increasingly similar.
Regardless ofhow valid this initial goal may be, however, Friedman largely
ignores the manner in which his theory of globalization will be realistically
implemented by States with social and legal systems not established on the
prificiples underlying those of the United States. He also fails to reconcile the
competing forces embodying the symbols of the Lexus and the olive tree and
neglects to illuminate a feasible way of satisfying both fundamental
requirements." However, he does recognize and discuss some of the
disadvantages of globalization. For instance, it may be too difficult for some
States to develop the internal political and economic policies necessary to take
advantage of the benefits of globalization. 12 States may also become so
connected that problems traditionally considered small and isolated may
become magnified.' 3 Similarly, processes within States may become so
6. DAVID HELD & ANTHONY MCGREw, GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS,

AND CULTURE at 2 (David Goldblatt & Jonathan Perraton, Polity Press 1999). For a discussion and
analysis of the other general schools of thought regarding globalization-the sceptics and the
transformationalists-see the remainder of the Introduction to this book.
7. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1,at 59.
8. Id. at 35.
9. Id. at 27. Friedman's depiction of the elements that influence human progress differs
somewhat from that expounded by Fukuyama, who depicts the challenge of progress as one
balancing economic prosperity with the desire for recognition. FUKUYAMA,SUpra note 3, at xvi.
10. FRIEDMAN, supranote I, at 27.
11. Speaking of the reconciliation of the symbols of the Lexus and the olive tree, Richard Elder
notes that Friedman's "book, successful in so much, never manages fully to confront the two, let
alone reconcile them, though it would like to." Richard Elder, The Global Village is Here. Resist
at Your Peril,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1999, at E8.
12. FRIEDMAN supranote !,at 333.
13. Id. at 340, 321 (noting examples such as the Y2K problem and global terrorism).

2000]

CONTROVERSIAL GLOBAL "DEMOCRACY"

transparent that individuals and organizations feel constantly intruded upon.14
Finally, globalization may end up being too "dehumanizing" as more
communication occurs between people and machines, and people through
machines, instead of face-to-face.15
But while Friedman raises the downside ofglobalization, his book focuses
predominately on the benefits of integrating into the global economy, what
globalization means for States and individuals, and what drives States to
participate in a globalized economy. Much of Friedman's discussion is
comparatively similar to the rationale behind Fukuyama's projection ofthe "end
of history." Fukuyama advances the idea that all States
undergoing economic modernization must increasingly
resemble one another: they must unify nationally on the basis
of a centralized state, urbanize, replace traditional forms of
social organization like tribe, sect, and family with
economically rational ones based on function and efficiency,
and provide for the universal education oftheir citizens. Such
societies have become increasingly linked with one another
through global markets and the spread of a universal
consumer culture.16
Friedman's view of a globalized world presupposes this same collection of
States based on the free-market capitalist economic system of the United
States. By focusing on the importance of supporting this reproduction of the
political and economic systems ofthe United States, Friedman places too much
emphasis on attaining the prosperity symbolized by the Lexus-thereby
diminishing the importance of preserving each individual State's olive trees-as
States strive for global acceptance and integration. The following section
recounts Friedman's globalization and discusses his basis for believing that
globalization is the new world order that has supplanted the former Cold War
system of international relations.

14. Id. at 341-42.
15. Id. at 345-46.
16. FUKUYAMA, supra note 3, at xiv-xv.
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A. Understandingthe Post-Cold War World
According to Friedman, money is the motivating factor driving the era of
globalization. 7 Developing States are in special need of money to build their
infrastructure so that they can provide their people with jobs and raise the
standard of living within their borders. During the Cold War, the United States
and the U.S.S.R. were willing to economically support developing States so
that each superpower could build allegiance and continue the idealistic war
between communist and democratic principles. Neither superpower cared nor
criticized whether a State had corrupt officials or provided protections for
private property because the important factor was which "side" they were
on. 8 However, investors are now financing these States. Investors are
willing to subsidize a developing State only in the hope that the State's success
in the global economy will also bring them a financial windfall. These investors
will not finance a State that tolerates corruption or maintains weak protections
for private property. 9 Thus, the most important players in the globalizedworld
are, according to Friedman, the private and institutional investors who buy and
sell the stocks and bonds issued by corporations and States.2" Friedman has
named these investors the "Electronic Herd," giving them the key roles of
instigating States to open their markets and judging States' performance by
extending or withdrawing investment. 2'
Equally as important for success in the globalized world is the approval of
the various rating companies responsible for supplying investors with
information relating to the risk or security of a particular investment, such as
Moody's Investors Service and Standard & Poor's.22 Without a high credit
rating from these institutions, States may be unable to acquire financing at
optimal interest rates and under desirable terms. Further, without the
necessary financial support, many States are unable to develop the technology
that will link them to the global market. However, to gain favorable credit
ratings by these institutions and approval from the Electronic Herd, States must
often demonstrate that they are moving toward a democratic governmental

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note I, at 93-119.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 94-95.
Id. at 94.
Id.
Id. at32.91.
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structure and a capitalist economy, for these measures provide comfort to the
Electronic Herd and insure that its investment will be protected.2 3
B. Friedman's "Democracy"
Democracy is generally presumed to encompass "a method for creating
binding collective decisions that are responsive to the wishes and values of a
political society. '24 However, what Friedman labels "democracy" actually
entails a methodology for generating connections to the global economy based
on capitalist free-market economic principles. This section will discuss
Friedman's conceptualization of the forces that have fostered the era of
globalization, elaborate on the distinction between democratic and capitalist
doctrines, and discuss the role of States that choose to either reject or ignore
the importance of integrating into the global economy.
1. The Democratizationsof Technology, Finance,and Information
The changes that were occurring in the fields of technology, finance, and
information by the late 1980s had a significant impact on the fall of the Berlin
Wall, as well as on other, less symbolic changes that signified the end of the
Cold War.25 Advances in technology were transforming the way we
communicated.2 6 Innovations in "computerization, telecommunications,
miniaturization, compression technology and digitization" were making it easier
for businesses and individuals to produce goods, exchange news, and connect
The "democratization of technology," according to
with one another.2
Friedman, enabled the world to move faster, smarter, and cheaper than ever
before.
Along with the democratization of technology came the
23. Id.
24. Donald E. Whistler etal., Conclusion: Devising Democracy, in BUILDING DEMOCRACY
IN ONE-PARTY SYSTEMS:

THEORETICAL PROBLEMS AND CROSS-NATION EXPERIENCES 223, 223

(Gary D. Wekkin et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter BUILDING DEMOCRACY].
25. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 40. David Andrews also identifies three "causes of the
increase in the degree of capital mobility" and thus, economic integration. These include: (1)
"advances in communications and information technologies," (2) "innovation by financial firms,"
and (3) the "liberalization of domestic capital markets." David M. Andrews, Capital Mobility and
State Autonomy: Toward a Structural Theory of International Monetary Relations, 38 INT'LSTUD.
Q. 193, 198 (1994).
26. See PETER DICKEN, GLOBAL SHIFT: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY,

97-119 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing how technological change affects internationalization and the
globalization of economic activity).
27. FRIEDMAN, supra note i, at 42.
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"democratization of information." With televisions, satellites, and video
equipment, governments could no longer "totally isolate their people from
information about what life was like beyond their borders" in different areas
of the world.2" In a world where everyone knows what it is like to live in the
United States, or the Hollywood equivalent thereof, governments "not only
have to prove that their alternative [to a free-market economy and democratic
system of government] can still produce rising standards of living but.., they
have to do it in an environment in which we all increasingly know how
everyone else lives."29
Add to these changes in technology and the dissemination of information
an environment where it is progressively easierto lend money to foreign States
and institutions-an environment where individuals can easily access financial
markets and transfer their money to different accounts and investments-and
you have the "democratization of finance." The democratization of finance
also included the opening of many new States to investment from outside their
borders, so that countries became less isolated and more financially connected
to foreign individuals and other States. Various forces and institutions have
influenced this integration, including the Electronic Herd, which aided the rapid
pace of the democratization of finance by investing in developing States and
multinational corporations all over the world.3"
The dispersment oftechnology, information, and financial connections on
a global scale led many States to adopt the outward manifestations of
democracy (such as free and open elections) so that they could conform to the
expectations of investors and their newly-informed public. Along with these
outward manifestations of democracy, States also began to open their markets
to compete in the global economy and attract investment.
2. Friedman'sConception of a "DemocraticCapitalist"State
The ideas Friedman expounds in The Lexus and the Olive Tree are
labeled "democratic," but are instead mainly "capitalist" in that they focus on
building States who are able to prosper in an international atmosphere where
28. Id. at 54-55.

29. Id. at 56 (original emphasis omitted).
30. Other institutions that have promoted the international economic order include the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. See Jost Delbrtlck, Globalization
of Law, Politics, and Markets-Implications for Domestic Law-A European Perspective I IND.J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9, 16-17 (1993).
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free markets reign. Friedman's "democratic capitalism" is built upon
transparency, standardized accounting procedures, lack ofcorruption, freedom
of the press, and a stable bond market.3' These "building blocks" are chosen
not for their democratic principles, but because they help investors gain
reliable information about States and their financial structures; to the extent
that they allow States to measure themselves against one another, the
application ofthese building blocks ensures that States will continue to compete
for investment dollars. This competition leads to further safeguards for
investors,but it does not support the idea that the internal political structure of
a State must necessarily become "democratic" to gain the trust of the
investment community.
In reality, the measures Friedman promulgates as necessary for States to
implement in order to "plug in" to the global market are not based on
democraticprinciples at all; they are based, rather, on what John Dryzek calls
an international economic regime. 2 "Regimes contain 'principles, norms, and
rules' together with 'decision-making procedures."" 3 There is no requirement
that these rules and procedures be democratic in any sense, even though they
do have the ability to "severely constrain the options of the states operating
within them. ' m Friedman's discussion ofthe "Golden Straitjacket" emphasizes
this notion. 5
The Golden Straitjacket is declared the "defining political-economic
garment ofthis globalization era"36 and like a regime, when "your country puts
on the Golden Straitjacket, two things tend to happen: your economy grows
and your politics shrinks."37 This idea has also been termed the "capital
mobility hypothesis" by economists who argue that "when capital is highly
mobile across international borders, the sustainable macroeconomic policy
31. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 141-63.
32. JOHN S. DRYZEK, DEMOCRACY IN CAPITALIST TIMES: IDEALS, LIMITS, AND STRUGGLES 79

(1996).
33. Id. (quoting Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes
as Intervening Variables,in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 1 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983)).
34. Id.
35. This theory has previously been discussed in David Held, Democracy, the Nation-State and
the Global System, in POLITICAL THEORY TODAY 197, 207 (1991) (asserting that "growing global
interconnectedness can lead to a decline or 'crisis' of state autonomy"). The conception of a
"Golden Straitjacket" is also similar to the "politics generated by advocates of a strong, laissez-faire
state" as described by Alfred C. Aman, Jr. in The Globalizing State: A Future-OrientedPerspective
on the Public/PrivateDistinction, Federalism, and Democracy, 31 VAND.J. OF TRANS'L L. 769,
803-05 (1998).
36. FRIEDMAN, supranote 1, at 86.

37. Id.at 87.
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options available to states are systematically circumscribed. ' 38 For a State to
grow and prosper, Friedman argues that it must both put on this Golden
Straitjacket and "plug in" to the Electronic Herd. However, as with the socalled building blocks of "democracy," though these measures promote
security for capital investment, they do not address the rights and freedoms
individually associated with democracy.3 9 For a State to fully put on the
Golden Straitjacket, it must begin
making the private sector the primary engine of its economic
growth, maintaining a low rate of inflation and price stability,
shrinking the size of its state bureaucracy, maintaining as
close to a balanced budget as possible, if not a surplus,
eliminating and lowering tariffs on imported goods, removing
restrictions on foreign investment, getting rid of quotas and
domestic monopolies, increasing exports, privatizing stateowned industries and utilities, deregulating capital markets,
making its currency convertible, opening its industries, stock,
and bond markets to direct foreign ownership and investment,
deregulating its economy to promote as much domestic
competition as possible, eliminating government corruption,
subsidies and kickbacks as much as possible, opening its
banking and telecommunications systems to private ownership
and competition, and allowing its citizens to choose from an
array of competing pension options and foreign-run pension
and mutual funds."
While Friedman acknowledges that some States will refuse to embrace these
measures even in a minimal way, he proclaims that very soon States will have
no choice but to put on this Straitjacket.4 With the rapid pace of the
technological developments fueling the free-market global economy, those
States who integrate all ofthese ideals into their political-economic system will
be able to take full advantage of the connections and support of the Electronic
Herd, while those who fail to implement them will become more isolated from
the world economy, and therefore further detached from the decision-making
38.
39.
40.
41.

Andrews, supra note 25, at 193.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 1,at 91.
Id. at 86-87.
Id. at90.
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process of the international polity.42 "The periphery is in even deeper trouble
in regard to democratization because of the constraints inherent in life at the
edge of the transnational political economy and the imperatives that the
international trade regime imposes on peripheral states and societies. 43
To the extent that States are increasingly adopting the elements of the
Golden Straitjacket or other truly democratic principles into their political
systems, Friedman's assertion that these developments can be attributed to
pressure by the Electronic Herd alone is unfounded. Since the end of the Cold
War, numerous organizations and international institutions have promulgated
the benefits of democratic government to protect human rights and the basic
freedoms that are associated with democracy (as opposed to the constraints
placed on individual freedom by communist and authoritarian governments) 4
Even the increased integration of international economic forces cannot be
attributed solely to private investors, banks, and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), as Friedman suggests. For decades, international political
organizations have discussed the need for economic integration to promote
world peace. In a 1934 publication of The World Tomorrow, an article
addressing the failure of the League of Nations stated:
A League that meant to remove the causes of war, instead of
merely stopping wars by police action, would have to legislate
and plan. It would soon be conferring the immense benefit of
economic order on all of us. No one could afford to walk out
of such a League. The power to withdraw economic benefits
would serve it as a means of discipline. It would rarely have
to use force.45
Likewise, the benefits of economic integration have also been proclaimed for
46
some time. Friedman's "Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention,"
which states that increased economic integration raises the cost of warfare for
connected countries to the point where traditional warfare would devastate
42. Id. at 91.
43. DRYZEK, supra note 32, at 91.
44. "[he increasing integration of the world's capital markets is a consequence of a variety
of developments .. " Andrews, supra note 25, at 198.
45. H. N. Brailsford, An InternationalPolice?, 17 WORLD TOMORROW 32, 33 (1934).
46. This theory became named after an investigation by Friedman led to the conclusion that
[n]o two countries that both had McDonald's had fought a war against each other since each got
its McDonald's." FRIEDMAN, supra note I, at 195.
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both the winner and the loser of the battle, was essentially asserted by
Immanuel Kant in the late 1700s. Kant maintained that, among other things,
extensive international commerce would help States maintain a "perpetual
peace."4 7 Since then, the idea has only been supported. Michael Doyle, who
studied the occurrence of international wars since 1817, has also found that
"liberal states, while they have engaged in wars with non-liberal states, have
remained at peace with one another."48
States who adopt capitalist democratic principles and continue to integrate
economically will improve their connections with each other, making decisions
that positively affect the connected international global community. At the
same time, however, the gap between States that adopt capitalist democratic
principles and those that do not will continue to widen. States that do not put
on the Golden Straitjacket will eventually become alienated unless the global
economy can remain flexible enough to adapt to a variety of economic regimes
in the world market. Without this flexibility, States not assimilating Friedman's
capitalist democratic principles will be denied the benefits of the global
economic system and their ability to attract foreign investment will diminish,
leaving them politically weak, financially unstable, and technologically
antiquated.
C. The Outsiders
Friedman attempts to acknowledge that not every State will conform to a
free-market economic system and democracy-based system of government.
Of those States that do "plug in," there will be individuals and groups within
them who will be against globalization. These individuals and groups will reject

47. See CHARLES COVELL, KANT AND THE LAW OF PEACE: A STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 160-61(1998), where the author states:
[I]t must be emphasized that it is equally evident that Kant regarded
cosmopolitan law as a law of commerce, and that he did so because he assumed
that the establishing of lasting international peace required not only the
entering by men into the civil state and the acceptance by nations and states
of a law defining their rights and duties, but also the acceptance by men and
states of a comprehensive legal regime providing for the proper regulation of
their mutual commerce in the international sphere.
Id. See also IMMANUEL KANT, PerpetualPeace: A PhilosophicalSketch, in KANT: POLITICAL
WRITINGS 93-130 (Hans Reiss ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1795); Susan
Marks, The End of History? Reflections on Some International Legal Thesis, 3 EJIL 449, 464
(1997).
48. Marks, supra note 47, at 465 (discussing Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies and
Foreign Affairs (pts. I & 2), 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 323 (1983)).
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the requirements of the Golden Straitjacket, and will continually attempt to
influence their governments to return to the way things were. 49 However,
Friedman fails to move beyond these individuals to conceptualize entire States
based on fundamentalist principals and the ramifications for the rest of the
world regarding the treatment of these States. The only concerns he
articulates with regard to these States include the increased chance that they
will engage in military conflict (and as they become increasingly disconnected
from the rest of the world they will have less to lose by doing so) and the fact
that they will hold little power in international relations due to their lack of
economic integration.5
In addition, some States may be politically or economically unable to keep
up with the pace of globalization and thus will be unable to connect to the
global economy in the near future. Other States may be culturally unable to
adopt the democratic principles and free-market economic structure that will
enable them to "plug in" to the international system. For these States,
Friedman points out, it will take even longer for the benefits ofglobalization to
reach individual citizens because "[i]t is a lot easier to develop a new-model
Lexus than it is to evolve a new variety of olive trees, which can take
generations."5 '
In the meantime, States who are culturally, politically, or economically
unable to integrate full-scale democratic political and capitalist economic
systems into their governmental and economic structures will be looking for
alternatives other than democratic capitalism that will both allow them to
benefit somewhat from global economic integration and secure the
preservation oftheir cultural, social, and political roots and traditions. For these
States, the era ofglobalization means adapting only the essentialcomponents
of these systems and modifying their existing structures as little as possible.
In this vein, Part II of this Essay discusses the future of "democracy" and why
it will have to expand and evolve to accommodate the various governmental
systems that will emerge to bolster capitalist economic activity.

49. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 267-283.
50. Id. at 366.

51. Id. at333.
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SYSTEM DOES NOT NECESSITATE A

DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL STRUCTURE

Capitalism can be defined as an "economic system in which all or most of
the means of production and distribution... [are] operated for profit, originally
under fully competitive conditions."52 While a capitalist economy is not
static-it "must either grow or decay into economic slump"-its underlying
premise in the present day remains unmodified from the original.53 However,
democracy by its very nature is active, and is capable of constant change and
expansion. 4 "Democracy is a politicalconcept, concerning the collectively
binding decisions about the rules and policies of a group, association or
society."'" To preserve cultural identity and maintain diversity in the global
era, democracy must be thought to encompass all types of governmental
systems that are based on "a general concept or ideal of self-rule on a footing
of equality among citizens, rather than [merely] to particular conceptions of
democratic politics and their institutional manifestations."56 Even the
democratic system in the United States cannot be labeled a pure democracy;
rather, it is an evolution of a governmental system based on the democratic
ideal. As Susan Marks notes: "a great variety of practices and institutions is
consistent with liberal democracy, but little attention is drawn to the diversity
of the values, ideas and principles that might animate those practices and
institutions. 57
As discussed in Part I, Friedman's democracy is more accurately labeled
a democratic capitalism because he, unlike other proponents of democracy,
does not focus on individual rights and representation in decision-making
processes when describing the building blocks of his "democratic" system.
Instead, he focuses primarily on the capitalist principles that are supported by
52.

WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 207 (3d ed. 1996).

53. DRYZEK, supra note 32, at 4-6.
54. Id.
55. David Beetham, Key Principles and Indices for a Democratic Audit, in DEFINING AND
MEASURING DEMOCRACY 28 (David Beetham ed., 1994).
56. Marks, supra note 47, at 450.
57. Id. at 470; Marks continues this assertion in her analysis of Fukuyama's book THE END
OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN, where she writes:

One striking feature of Fukuyama's argument is that it largely proceeds as if
there is, and can be, only one liberalism, one democracy and one liberal
democracy.... Fukuyama fails to consider the diversity of values and beliefs
that contributes to producing divergent understandings of the meaning of
liberalism and democracy, and of their interrelation.
Id. at 456.
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a democratic political system. 8 However, while the combination ofa capitalist
economic system and democratic government may be the most viable option
in the global era (and some argue the only remaining option for developing
States), there are still examples of developed States who have maintained a
nondemocratic governmental system and thrived in a free-market global
economy, including Singapore and Chile.59 In fact, Dryzek argues that
market capitalism does not determine a particular kind of
political structure beyond a state to carry out the essential
functions of enforcing contracts, securing private property
rights, and issuing and controlling money, without which
markets cannot easily function. Authoritarian political
systems, therefore, can and do exist in a capitalist economic
context.60
Singapore, a State that maintains an authoritarian political system coupled with
liberal economic policies, is the eleventh largest trading partner ofthe United
States, and has only a population of roughly three million.' Similarly, in Chile,
"economic success stands in the shadow of seventeen years of an oppressive
authoritarian government that rose from the overthrow of the first
' 62
democratically elected Marxist government.
These States have found ways to nourish their capitalist economic systems
while maintaining nondemocratic political systems, primarily because ofthe
predilection of international lending institutions (such as the World Bank and
58. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights identifies
three elements which, in addition to the periodic recall of representatives, are
commonly highlighted in international legal accounts of democracy's
entailments: human rights, especially freedoms of expression, association and
assembly, but also the whole range of other civil rights and freedoms; the rule
of law, understood to refer not just to a state in which public authorities are
obliged to act within the law, but also to a state in which citizens' rights are
legally underwritten (so that, for instance, legal remedies for abuse of fights
are available); and the separation of public powers, involving above all an
independent judiciary."
James Crawford & Susan Marks, The Global Democracy Deficit, in RE-IMAGINING POLITICAL
COMMUNITY 81 (Daniele Archibugi et al. eds., 1998).
59. Rafael X. Zahralddin-Aravena, Chile and Singapore: The Individual and the Collective,
a Comparison, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 739-740 (1998).
60. DRYZEK, supra note 32, at 24 ("[P]olitical authoritarianism and capitalism has flourished
in southern Europe, East Asia, and Latin America ... ").
61. Zahralddin-Aravena, supra note 59, at 767-68.
62. Id. at 739.
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the IMF) that reward them for maintaining oppressive regimes. In the opinion
of these lending institutions, in contrast to the Electronic Herd and most
investors, it is preferable "to work with authoritarian rather than with
democratically-elected leaders" 63 because individuals in democracies "often
prefer economic policies that are redistributive and therefore constrain the
market."' For this reason, establishing an authoritarian political system may
actually benefit developing States in need of capital from these international
lending institutions and, consequently, discourage the establishment of
democratically-elected governments.
Social pressures in developing States may also require them to implement
various democratic canons while specifically excluding others. The following
sections develop the advantages of encouraging various forms of
"democracy" to complement capitalist economic regimes and the ways in
which transnational and international institutions force the hand of States in
deciding to "choose" to implement capitalist principles and certain political
systems in the era of globalization.
A. Democracy Within IndividualStates
Dryzek argues that, historically, capitalistic "self-interest-and the
commercial, capitalist society that secured it-were good for democracy."65
However, when economic rationality is allowed unlimited extension from the
marketplace into politics, the effects may overwhelm the democratic system,
leading to its demise. "[T]he more people experience markets, the more likely
they are to become creatures of exit rather than voice, and the less conducive
their behavior will be to the operation of democracy."6 6 While Friedman
argues that the United States is the perfect model of capitalist-democratic
principles, and thus provides an ideal blueprint for emerging democracies to
follow to ensure success in the global era, Dryzek concludes that the United
States is actually a better example of the varietiesof democracy that can be
adopted by different States. He notes that the United States actually contains
"a surprisingly rich variety of alternative discourses, [including] ...
contented
republicanism, deferential conservatism, disaffected populism, and private
63. Nicole Wendt, 50th Anniversary of the World Bank and the IMF Prompts Criticisms, 9
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 153 (1999).

64. Chantal Thomas, Does the "Good Governance Policy" of the International Financial
Institutions Privilege Markets at the Expense of Democracy?, 14 CONN.J. INT'L L. 551, 558 (1999).
65. DRYZEK, supra note 32, at 95.
66. Id.at 104.
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liberalism."67 Because the intricacies of these alternatives are not as important
as the identification of their existence, they will not be fully discussed in this
Essay. However, it is important to note that while these alternatives obviously
overlap with some ofthe basic principles of democracy, they simultaneously
extend the possibilities available for developing States and provide options for
the development of political structures that will be compatible with a capitalist
free-market economic system.68
1. The Danger in Moving Too Quickly
Developing States, especially those accustomed to one-party governmental

systems, may innately distrust the multi-party system of the traditional and
American democratic models. Hence, democracy in these States will naturally

seek to retain a one-party system (thus demonstrating unity and common
identity), even while implementing other tenets of democracy, like freedom of
speech and freedom of association. 69 These States will necessarily have to

leave the development of a multi-party democratic system to time; forcing a
multi-party system would place too much strain on the validity and success of
other newly-implemented democratic principles. Where individuals and States
have attempted to initiate "democracy without recognizing and fostering
institutions of democratic governance, as in the case of former President
Vaclav Havel's existential vision ofan anti-political politics in Czechoslovakia,
democratization has proven a vehicle for societal acrimony and, in this case,
even a cause of the dissolution of the state."70
States who have attained "higher standard[s] of living and have moved
above the agricultural stage of production" have a better chance at
67. Id.at 117. Dryzek defines discourse as a "system of possibility for apprehending the world,
constituted by common capabilities that enable readers and listeners to assemble words, phrases, and
sentences into coherent and intelligible wholes." Id.at 116. A system of capitalist democracy,
therefore, constitutes one such discourse. For a greater discussion on the alternative discourses
proposed by Dryzek, see id. at 116-44.
68. Alerting developing States to the possibility of options to an American-based democratic
governmental system should also create less resistance to the adoption of an economic system based
on capitalist principles than if capitalism and democracy (both modeled after the United States) are
peddled together as a pair. Likewise, States will be more likely to "plug in" to the global freemarket economy if they believe that, in doing so, they will not be forced to forego their right to
choose the underlying governmental system that will support this capitalist economic regime and
to choose it on their own terms, at their own pace.
69. See Harold F. Bass, Jr., Change and Democratization in One-Party System4t in BUILDING
DEMOCRACY, supra note 24, at 70, 77.
70. Michael A. Kelley et al., The Democratic Impulse and the Movement Toward Democracy:
An Introduction, in BUILDING DEMOCRACY, supra note 24, at 1, 10.
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successfully integrating democracy, though the transition still may not be
smooth.7 Abruptly instituting capitalism into the economy can cause severe
repercussions: "Competition means loss of job security. Restitution of
property means loss of housing security. ...Overcoming shortages means
rapidly rising prices and spiralling [sic] inflation."7 2 For these reasons, States
should not be encouraged to move toward democracy at a pace that exceeds
their ability to adjust to the democratic practices necessary to attain this goal.
Furthermore, States must be aware that there are various options to consider
when implementing democratic and free-market principles into their existing
political and economic structures. Particularly, decisions regarding the
underlying structure ofthe democracy-unitary, federal, unicameral, bicameral,
parliamentary, or presidential-can help a State ease the transition to a
democratic government.7 3 However, even the flexibility offered by these
options may not allow for enough creativity to ensure success in States with
diverse ethnic, religious, and linguistic histories.
2. The Effects of History
Particular problems for democracy exist in Africa, where State lines were
arbitrarily drawn by colonial powers to divide the continent, with a complete
disregard for the natural boundaries created by language, religion, and
ethnicity. Now that these African States are independent, they face numerous
problems resulting from the lack of homogeneity inside their borders and the
scars from decades of colonial oppression, military resistance, and economic
decline.74 In these States, Michael Kelley argues, it will be enormously
difficult for the existing governments to implement democratic principles and
economic systems fashioned after those of the United States.75

71.

Axel Hadenius, The Duration of Democracy: Institutional vs. Socio-Economic Factors,in
ed., 1994).
72. Robin Alison Remington, Democracy and the Market in East Central Europe: The Hard
Choices, in BUILDING DEMOCRACY, supra note 24, at 139, 157.
73. Whistler et al., supra note 24, at 226.
74. See Julius E. Nyang'oro, Building Pluralist Democracy in Africa, in BUILDING
DEMOCRACY, supra note 24, at 85; Michael A. Kelley, Democracy and Economic Liberalism: The
Foundations of Hope in Africa, in BUILDING DEMOCRACY, supra note 24, at 104, 107. "Ethnic
DEFINING AND MEASURING DEMOCRACY 85 (David Beetham

agitation, chauvinism, political instability, and corruption, along with class conflicts and cultural
impediments, will continue to remain obstacles to development no matter how potentially
salubrious an approach to the region's problems." Id
75. Kelley, supra note 74, at 107.
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[T]he strains and stresses on fragile African political
institutions occasioned by "central-local tensions, factionalism
and intensive competition, inexperience in political office and
a pervasive tradition of opposition to central government"
mean that many governments have failed their first obligation
to provide the political stability necessary for effective
economic choices.76
Obviously, the fast pace of technological development and the continuing
strength of a global market economy will only add to the strain felt by these
African States, for internal instability and underdevelopment provide enormous
obstacles to democratic advancement. These States must be resourceful and
innovative in implementing democratic governments and capitalist economic
regimes, for the traditional forms of these systems may face too much
opposition for their implementation to be successful.
The principles of modem, and especially American, democracy may also
be completely at odds with the moral and social structures that hold a State
together. By disrupting the influence of these factors, societies that achieve
economic success in the global era may nonetheless fail to improve the lives
oftheir citizens in that, with that success, the social structure of their societies
will become unraveled." This, of course, is the predicament Friedman
illustrates through his symbols of the Lexus and the olive tree. Without a
connection to one's roots and social heritage, democracy and economic
success are rendered meaningless.
An additional problem arises when American values are imposed upon
States as part of an overall global democratic package. Even though a State
accepts democracy and implements a capitalist economic system, it does not
mean that the State also wants to integrate American values into its society.
Many individuals believe that "American values are nothing more than soulless
consumerism and mindless technology worship"7 and, as such, have no place
in their society. Offering various means of implementing democratic and
76. Id. (quoting DONALD G. MORRISON, UNDERSTANDING
ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL CHANGE AND NATION BUILDING 83 (1989)).

BLACK AFRICA: DATA AND

See generally Kevin D. Brown,

Globalization and Cultural Conflict in Developing Countries: The South African Example, 7 IND.
225 (1999).
77. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF ORDER (1997). This book examines the problems
faced by modem democracies due to the breakdown of the moral and social codes that once served
to maintain order in society.
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78. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 327.
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capitalistic ideals to developing States may dismantle the relationship between
American values and these democratic and capitalistic ideals, and may make
States less wary of attempting to assimilate the positive aspects of democracy
and capitalism into their own societies.79
In the era of globalization, however, it may not matter whether an
individual State independently chooses to adopt capitalist ideals and democratic
principles, since States that belong to international and transnational
organizations may be required to opt into this economic and/or governmental
form in order to participate in these organizations. As States become
increasingly connected both economically and politically, the existence ofthese
institutions becomes a necessary evil that helps States maintain amicable
relationships with each other and address common problems. However,
though these institutions allow States to have a voice in the global community,
this privilege comes at a cost.
B. TransnationalDemocracy
Transnational organizations such as the United Nations (UN), trade
regimes such as the European Union (EU) and the North American FreeTrade Agreement (NAFTA), and even lending institutions such as the World
Bank through the IMF, place certain requirements on States before they are
allowed tojoin or participate in the organization or regime. With the increasing
number of international and transnational organizations that have been
established since the Cold War, States are frequently asked to forego their
own national economic and political agendas in favor of uniform global
programs and approaches to problems. "[E]ven core states are increasingly
forced to follow policies dictated by international trade regimes and other
economic forces."8 0 David Held has noted that "[i]n 1909 there were 37
[international governmental organizations (IGOs)] and 176 [international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs)], while in 1989 there were nearly 300
IGOs and 4,624 INGOs."' 1 Of course, while membership in the EU and
79. "The future of democracy in capitalist times therefore depends on the activation of
alternatives to economic rationality in social and political life." DRYZEK, supra note 32, at 14546.
80. Id.; see also, Thomas, supra note 64, at 556 ("Sovereignty appears increasingly less unified
and more divisible, and virtually all states, not just developing countries, have partially ceded some
important aspects of their powers to govern.").
81. David Held, Democracy and Globalization, in RE-IMAGINING POLITICAL

COMMUNITY,

supra note 58, at 20. See also James N. Rosenau, Governance and Democracy in a Globalizing
World, in RE-IMAGINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY, supra note 58, at 31.
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NAFTA is based on geographic location, both trade regimes also place other
obligations on their Member States.
The EU requires that its members accept "[u]nion citizenship, obligatory
judiciary, binding legislative powers by majority vote, and supremacy" ofthe
law of the European Community over domestic law.82 A side agreement to
NAFTA, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC),
requires members to enforce certain environmental and labor standards. a3
Likewise, members of the UN must agree to enforce a global human rights
agenda-the violation of which may lead to sanctions. 4 Furthermore, States
that receive financing from the IMF are often required to implement numerous
economic policies to "strengthen" their internal economy and provide greater
assurance to the IMF of a return on investment.8 5 The policies required by
these lending institutions, however, often work against those promoted by
organizations like the UN. This creates even more difficulty for developing
States trying to gain favor with both international lending institutions and
powerful, democratic States. 6 These obligations and requirements are only
a small fraction of the compromises States must make to participate in global
institutions and organizations.
Held believes that these transnational and international organizations as
well as other characteristics of the global era, like greater economic
dependency, lead to two conclusions about the state ofthe democratic political
community:
82. Delbruck, supra note 30, at 18.
83. See Clyde Summers, NAFTA's Labor Side Agreement and InternationalLabor Standards,
3 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 173 (1999) (arguing that the side agreement is not being enforced
and is therefore unsuccessful in protecting the environment and labor rights).
84. Louis Henkin states:
In the aftermath of human rights violations in Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia, the United Nations established international criminal tribunals to
identify and punish the perpetrators of the atrocities ... Whereas resolutions
of the U.N. General Assembly are not binding upon U.N. members, the U.N.
Charter obligates members to obey Security Council Resolutions . . . The
Security Council is authorized only to issue a binding resolution to combat a
threat to international peace and security .
. In order to mandate
international action against human rights violations, the Security Council must
first find that the violations threaten peace and security across national
boundaries.
Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera, 68
Fordham L. Rev. I, 10 & n. 38 (1999) (internal citations omitted).
85. "In pursuing a particular line of economic policy, the IMF may insist as a condition of its
loan to a government that the latter cut public expenditure, devalue its currency and cut back on
subsidized welfare programmes." Held, supra note 35, at 217.
86. Thomas, supra note 64, at 551.
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First, the locus of effective political power can no longer be
assumed to be national governments-effective power is
shared and bartered by diverse forces and agencies at
national, regional and international levels. Second, the idea of
a political community offate-ofa self-determining collectivity
which forms its own agenda and life conditions-can no longer
meaningfully be located within the boundaries of a single
nation-state alone. 7
In sum, the abundance oftransnational democratic organizations serves to
undermine the authority of all Member States, democratic or otherwise, in
certain areas (i.e., human rights, labor rights, environmental issues, and some
economic issues). "Nations are heralding democracy at the very moment at
which changes in the international order are compromising the viability ofthe
independent democratic nation-state." 8 Thus, it is uncertain what the effects
of this power shift will be in regard to the autonomy and role of individual
States in the era of globalization. 9 While it is clear that States must adopt
capitalist economic measures to compete in the global economy, it is less
certain that States must also implement democratic governmental principles in
order to have a voice in the global community. Although a democratic political
structure may support a capitalist economy, it does not seem conclusive that
anything beyond free and open elections is requiredby States to participate
in decisionmaking at the international level and to gain the support of the
Electronic Herd in the era of globalization.9 On the contrary, the World Bank
and the IMF might argue that democratic principles are the least important
factor for States to integrate in order to succeed in a capitalist, free-market
global economy. 9
87. Held, supranote 81, at 21.
88. Held, supra note 35, at 197.
89. As Friedman notes, when "all politics is local, your vote matters. But when the power
shifts to these transnational spheres, there are no elections and there is no one to vote for."
FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 161.
90. "Given the diversity of polities and traditions in the world, and given the inbuilt resistance
of the states system to the international regulation of national affairs," requiring free and open
elections "probably represents the limit of what the still frail global system of states can be
expected to accept and promote as a right of peoples assertable against their own, and other,
governments." Marks, supra note 47, at 462 (quoting Thomas Franck, Democracy as a Human
Right, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 73, 75 (L. Henkin & J. Hargrove

eds., 1994)).
91. "The tendency of the [international financial institutions] to favor markets at the expense
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CONCLUSION

Democratic governments are not born overnight. Rather, democracy is a
process that grows and develops with time as individuals assert their right to
participate in government and hold their elected officials accountable for the
decisions that are made. "It's easy to declare a free market in your country.
What's difficult is to establish evenhanded enforcement of equitable laws and
commercial codes, with courts that will protect people from unfettered
capitalism." 92 Developing States should not be expected to painlessly
incorporate democratic principles into their existing political and economic
structures. Likewise, they should not be forced to embrace ideals that are
contrary to their social and political heritage. As Friedman notes: "You cannot
build an emerging society-which is so essential for dealing with the
globalization system-if you are simultaneously destroying the cultural
foundations that cement your society and give it the self-confidence and
cohesion to interact properly with the world." 93 Likewise, the global
community must realize that each State will react to the demands ofthe global
market-and the opportunities created by it-in a different way. In the global
market, no State is beyond the need for constant change and refinement. Even
the Electronic Herd may be pressured to change its standards as strong,
nondemocratic States begin to succeed in the global economy.
On a recent trip to Davos, Switzerland, U.S. President Bill Clinton noted:
"In order to include the developing world in the benefits of globalization, the
well-off have to make some adjustments."9 4 President Clinton's attitude
reflects what I believe must be the prevailing conception of the era of
globalization-that all States must learn from each other and accept the nuances
and diversity inherent in each State in order for the global economy to become
an optimal trading mechanism. This conception requires the Electronic Herd
and every State participating in the global economy to "adjust" to the specific

of democracy arises from this phenomenon[,] ... according to which a well-functioning democratic
process will often lead to redistribution away from a minority of dominant market actors; it will
therefore thwart [international financial institution] policies designed to favor such actors in the
interest of generating growth." Thomas, supra note 64, at 559.
92. FRIEDMAN, supra note I, at 130.
93. Id. at 243.
94. Jane Perlez, At Conference on Trade, Clinton Makes Pitchfor Poor, N.Y.TIMEs, Jan. 30,
2000, at A6.
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political and economic structures of developing and nondemocratic States, so
that all States may reap the "benefits of globalization."
This vision runs contrary to Friedman's assertions that success in an
economically integrated world will only be possible for democratic States that
have integrated capitalist principles into their economic structure. 95 Friedman
argues that States will be unable to gain the financial backing ofthe Electronic
Herd without the implementation of at least rudimentary democratic ideals
based on those of the United States. He stresses that the "three
democratizations were mostly nurtured in America. The Golden Straitjacket
was mostly made in America. The Electronic Herd is led by American Wall
Street bulls, and the most powerful agent pressuring other countries to open
their markets for free trade and free investment is Uncle Sam."'96 His
message is simple-to be successful in the era ofglobalization, you must either
be or beat the United States97 -and he is convinced that the United States, as
the champion of the global era, is unbeatable. As China moves closer toward
acceptance into the World Trade Organization, it will be interesting to see if
Friedman's pronouncements will hold. Must all States entering the global
marketplace become a carbon-copy United States to be successful? Or will
the addition ofa strong nondemocratic State like China change the playing field
so that, as President Clinton opined, all States-including the United States-will
have to "adjust" to remain competitive?
In the meantime, many States who "choose" democracy will be in the
process of democratizing,98 or will be evolving a democratic system to conform
to their own social, legal, and political traditions by deliberately choosing only
fragments of the American democratic system of government. "[D]emocracy
is not to be regarded as an 'all-or-nothing affair', which a state either has or
does not have, but as a matter of degree, according to how far the principles
of popular control and political equality are realized in practice." 99 In some

95. FRIEDMAN supra note 1, at 130.
96. Id. at 309.
97. In other words, "if you can't beat 'em, join 'em."
98. Friedman asserts this as well, noting that some States will not be able to keep up the with
the time frame that the Electronic Herd demands. FRIEDMAN, supra note I, at 333.
99. Stuart Weir, Primary Control and Auxiliary Precautions: A Comparative Study of
Democratic Institutions in Six Nations, in DEFINING AND MEASURING DEMOCRACY 113 David
Beetham ed., 1994). Weir's article provides an in-depth look at the democratic systems of the
United Kingdom, Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, and the United States, and illuminates the
various ways a State may personalize the various tenets of democracy to fit its own history and
political agendas. Id.
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cases, democratic principles may not even be part of the recipe for a State's
success in the global economy.
Though the pace of technology may force many States to adopt capitalist
and democratic systems more rapidly than they would like, technology cannot
insist upon the immediate and total acceptance of these systems. "In order to
be sustenable [sic], the rate of social and political change must not be greater
than a state's democratic 'carrying capacity' or the ability of people and
society to assimilate the costs associated with movement to democracy and
free-markets."' 0 0 In some cases, States may not be able to integrate
democracy into their political structure in any form because of moral, social,
or historical obstacles. In these cases, perhaps it will be the democratic States,
and the Electronic Herd itself, that must relax their own standards and evolve
their own systems to complement or adopt the strengths of these
nondemocratic States.
However, according to Friedman, there is no time to slow down and wait
for developing States to assimilate the ideals of democracy and capitalism into
their social structures, and there is no option but economic stagnation for States
that choose to play by their own rules in this game of globalization. States
must eitherjump on the globalization bandwagon now, or suffer the enormous
costs oftechnological underdevelopment, economic stagnation or decline, and
political isolation from the international decision-making community.
Unfortunately, many States will be unable to balance the symbolic Lexus and
olive tree with so much emphasis placed on economic success and global
market integration and, while they may succeed in the "drive for sustenance,
improvement, prosperity and modernization"'' ° by instituting capitalist
economic principles, the global community will increasingly become a rootless,
homeless orphan in the process. To curb the disintegration of the cultural,
moral, and historic roots that hold individual States together, creative forms of
democracy must be promoted, and nondemocratic, capitalist States must be
accepted. Otherwise, developing States may reject integration into the global
community altogether and, by doing so, eliminate their prospects for success
and growth in the era of globalization-to the detriment of all States.

100. Kelley et al., supra note 70, at 10.
101. FRIEDMAN, supra note i, at 27.

